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Summary  18 
To understand how global warming can be kept well-below 2°C and even 1.5°C, climate policy uses 19 
scenarios that describe how society could reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. However, current 20 
scenarios have a key weakness: they typically focus on reaching specific climate goals in 2100. This 21 
choice may encourage risky pathways that delay action, reach higher-than-acceptable mid-century 22 
warming, and rely on net carbon-dioxide removal thereafter to undo their initial shortfall in 23 
emissions reductions. Here we draw on physical science insights to propose a scenario framework 24 
that focusses on capping global warming at a specific maximum level with either temperature 25 
stabilisation or reversal thereafter. The ambition of climate action until carbon neutrality determines 26 
peak warming, and can be followed by a variety of long-term states with different sustainability 27 
implications. This new approach closely mirrors the intentions of the UN Paris Agreement, and makes 28 
questions of intergenerational equity explicit design choices.  29 
Main text  30 
International climate policy aims to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 31 
system1. Since about a decade ago, decision makers have begun translating this broad objective into 32 
more specific temperature limits2. Such temperature goals have limitations but can serve as a proxy 33 
for climate impacts, at both global and local scales3-5. In 2015, the Paris Agreement concluded many 34 
years of negotiation and reset the aim of international climate policy to holding global warming to 35 
levels well-below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C6 – an objective which in its entirety is 36 
referred to as the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goal6 (LTTG). The Paris Agreement LTTG 37 
hence defines an envelope of acceptable climate outcomes, which – it specifies – should be pursued 38 
in the broader context of sustainable development7 (see Methods for more background on the 39 
LTTG). 40 
Scenarios of the combined energy-economy-environment system provide key tools to explore how 41 
the future could evolve, and how today’s decisions could affect longer-term outcomes8. Over the 42 
past decades, researchers have extensively used such scenarios to identify integrated solutions that 43 
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can limit climate change, and to inform international climate policy8,9. This literature does not cover 44 
all possible interpretations of global climate goals with equal detail and depth. The vast majority of 45 
scenarios available in the literature either aim to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations over the 46 
21st century10,11 or attempt to limit end-of-century radiative forcing to specific levels8,12,13. In a related 47 
approach, scenarios prescribe an overall limit on total cumulative CO2 or greenhouse gas emissions 48 
over the 21st century, as a proxy for global-mean temperature rise in the year 210014,15. Models are 49 
then optimized to achieve these objectives in a cost-effective manner.  50 
Focussing on end-of-century outcomes, combined with discounting long-term compared to present-51 
day mitigation, leads to a feature that is present in virtually all resulting scenarios: the assumed 52 
possibility of substantial net negative CO2 emissions in the second half of the century allows for 53 
weaker emissions reductions in the nearer term and results in temporarily higher warming over the 54 
course of the century. Because of their end-of-century focus, many current scenarios hence 55 
contradictorily suggest that the best way of keeping warming to a specific level in 2100 is achieved by 56 
temporarily exceeding the set maximum level before 2100. Such interpretations seem to be 57 
inconsistent with the text of the UN Paris Agreement LTTG6,7.  58 
A focus on end-of-century outcomes also results in the perception that meeting temperature goals in 59 
line with the Paris Agreement requires substantial levels of net negative emissions8,16-18 which 60 
continue to increase until 2100, and that putting an explicit cap on the gross deployment of carbon-61 
dioxide removal (CDR) measures will also affect the maximum warming over the 21st century19. (For 62 
the sake of clarity, we here consistently use the term net negative emissions to refer to actual 63 
removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. We refer to CDR when referring to specific technologies or 64 
measures, although these terms are currently used interchangeably in the literature20,21.) The 65 
assumed rapid scale-up and potential land-use consequences of large-scale CDR in stringent 66 
mitigation scenarios8,21,22 have increased the perception that meeting stringent climate goals is 67 
infeasible or, in some cases, socially undesirable due to sustainability and intergenerational equity 68 
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concerns17,23-25. For these and other reasons, scholars have labelled these scenarios as particularly 69 
risky26,27.  70 
However, the perceived linkage between end-of-century outcomes and the amount of late-century 71 
net negative emissions is not robust; instead, it is to a large degree driven by the design 72 
characteristics underlying the scenario cohort currently available in the literature8,26,28,29. Specifically, 73 
net negative emissions correlate with temperature goals such as 1.5°C or 2°C in most of the currently 74 
available scenarios because these scenarios attempt to achieve temperature goals by optimizing 75 
costs and emissions over the entire century. Such an approach does not consider a limit to peak 76 
temperature rise which, for low temperature targets, typically occurs well before 2100. Under such 77 
an approach, changes in gross CDR deployment also change the maximum amount of warming over 78 
the course of the century19, because peak warming is not one of the current design criteria for 79 
mitigation scenarios.  80 
Here we present a new simple mitigation scenario logic that enables studies to explore climate action 81 
strategies that cap global warming at a specific level, and that makes intergenerational trade-offs 82 
regarding the timing and stringency of mitigation action an explicit design criterion. In addition, it 83 
provides a framework in which future CDR deployment can be explored independently from 84 
variations of desired climate outcomes, in the light of social, technological, or ethical 85 
concerns16,17,21,23-27. Earlier climate change mitigation scenarios were designed by putting a limit to 86 
greenhouse gas concentrations30, the radiative impact of climate pollution13 and in some cases also 87 
directly on temperature change19. In most cases, these scenarios aimed at reaching this limit at a 88 
specific time in the future after a period over which the target limit could be temporarily exceeded30, 89 
at times referred to as an overshoot. In the context of on-going climate change and the Paris 90 
Agreement LTTG of keeping warming well-below 2°C or 1.5°C, these existing approaches do not 91 
adequately cap the maximum or peak warming over the next decades.  92 
This new scenario logic is grafted onto an envelope of alternative interpretations of the Paris 93 
Agreement LTTG7,31, and can be combined with the existing Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) 94 
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framework which explores different alternative socio-economic futures and their implications for the 95 
challenges of mitigation and adaptation32. The SSPs are typically combined with end-of-century 96 
radiative forcing targets13 consistent with the representative concentration pathways (RCPs) that are 97 
used by the climate modelling community for climate change projections13. This approach by 98 
construction suffers from the weaknesses highlighted earlier, and the new mitigation scenario logic 99 
presented here can hence further improve the integrative work of the current SSP scenario 100 
framework in light of informing the implementation of the UN Paris Agreement.  101 
Structural elements of the climate goal 102 
Our proposed scenario logic builds on a three-part decomposition of the Paris Agreement LTTG. At 103 
the basis of this decomposition is a focus on peak warming rather than end-of-century warming. In 104 
the specific context of the Paris Agreement’s LTTG, a focus on peak warming implies that global-105 
mean temperature rise needs to be halted at a level well-below 2°C, potentially well before the end 106 
of the century, and that afterwards it should at least remain stable or decrease gradually (see 107 
Methods). Interpretations of other sections of the Paris Agreement even suggest that a temperature 108 
decline after having peaked would be an integral part of the Paris Agreement’s intentions, because 109 
achieving the mandated net zero greenhouse gas emissions target of the Paris Agreement would 110 
result in a gradual reversal of temperature rise over time33.  111 
We identify three structural elements that together can describe possible temperature evolutions 112 
consistent with the Paris Agreement: (i) the time at which global-mean temperature reaches its peak 113 
level, (ii) the level of warming at that point in time, and (iii) the temperature trend after the peak, 114 
being either stable or declining. Each of these three elements can be prescribed directly or 115 
approximated with geophysical emission constraints based on the well-established concept of the 116 
near-linear temperature response to cumulative emissions of carbon15,34,35, combined with 117 
considerations of limits to non-CO2 emissions. Subsequently, these structural elements can be 118 
modelled and prescribed independently in scenarios (Table 1, Figure 1, and Methods).  119 
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The use of a limit on cumulative CO2 emissions or of a net zero target as a way to make global climate 120 
mitigation goals more fathomable has been suggested by several scholars in the past. Firstly, it has 121 
been proposed as a geophysically appropriate way of responding to the climate change mitigation 122 
challenge35-38, and subsequently also as a useful way to provide climate policy with an actionable and 123 
stable long-term emissions target39-41. Achieving net zero CO2 emissions, however, is not yet 124 
sufficient to meet the emission reduction requirements spelled out in the Paris Agreement, which 125 
demand that a balance between sinks and sources of all greenhouse gases is achieved33. Our 126 
proposed scenario logic allows modellers to translate these geophysical and political science insights 127 
in a quantitative framework. Importantly, this new scenario logic defines how models that simulate 128 
the energy-economy-environment system can be used to compute climate change mitigation 129 
scenarios but does not change the fundamental rules on which these models are built to represent 130 




Figure 1 | Three structural elements defining the level of achievement of the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature 134 
goal (LTTG). a, schematic overview of structural pathway elements and relationship between pathway elements and global 135 
mean temperature (GMT) outcomes. Specifically, the schematic shows how a specific level of peak warming leaves open 136 
many post-peak options with different levels of net negative emissions. Subplots show quantitative outcomes, as found in 137 
scenarios from the literature (grey crosses, Methods, https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB/) and scenarios used in this study 138 
(red markers). Orange features show sensitivity variations in the level of non-CO2 mitigation in scenarios (see main text, 139 
Methods, and Extended Data Figure 1); b, relationship between maximum cumulative CO2 emissions achieved at the time 140 
of net zero CO2 and peak warming, highlighting the importance of also addressing non-CO2 emissions in addition to 141 
reaching net zero CO2 emissions; c, relationship between the timing of reaching net zero CO2 emissions and peaking GMT. 142 
Additional mitigation of non-CO2 emissions is required for temperatures to stabilize. GMT peaking values from literature 143 
scenarios (grey crosses) appear binned because they are reported at decadal time intervals, while timing of net zero CO2 144 
emissions from this study are binned by design; d, relationship between sustained net annual negative emissions and the 145 
rate of temperature change by the end of the century.  146 
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Table 1 | Translation of the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goal (LTTG) into three structural scenario design 147 
elements. Fig. 1 illustrates these structural elements, while more detailed information is provided in the Methods section. 148 




Range informed by 
the Paris Agreement 





Values used in this 
study 






Broadly in the second 
half of the century 
based on mitigation 
target specified in 
Article 4 of Paris 
Agreement and a 
consistent range of 
non-CO2 forcing40 
Peak warming is reached around 
the time global CO2 emissions 
reach net zero38,42, and non-CO2 
emissions have to be limited so 
that their warming contribution 
stabilizes or declines.  
The timing of 
reaching global net 
zero CO2 emissions 
can be prescribed, 




targeted until the 
time of net zero 
CO2 emissions.  
Net zero CO2 
emissions are 
prescribed in 
scenarios for 2050, 
2060, and 2070. 
Non-CO2 emissions 
are limited at a 
level consistent 
with the concurrent 
CO2 reductions. 
2) Level of peak 
warming or 
level at which it 
is stabilised 
Well below 2°C 
relative to 
preindustrial levels, 
pursuing to limit it to 
1.5°C 
There is an approximately linear 
relationship between peak 
global-mean temperature and 
the total cumulative amount of 
anthropogenic CO2 
emissions15,34,35. Maximum net 
cumulative CO2 emissions are 
reached once global CO2 
emissions reach net zero.  
The total amount of 
CO2 emissions until 
the time of reaching 
net zero CO2 (i.e. 
the maximum 
allowable carbon 
budget) can be 
prescribed. 




forcings is explored 
that would lead to 
peak warming 
below 2°C relative 
to preindustrial 
levels with at least a 





Zero or negative 
(temperatures either 
to stay constant or to 
peak and decline at a 
given rate) 
Maintaining net zero CO2 
emissions results in global-mean 
temperatures remaining 
approximately constant for 
centuries34, provided non-CO2 
emissions are limited so as to not 
to result in continuous further 
warming. Net negative CO2 




amount of annual 
net negative CO2 
emissions to be 
achieved after 
reaching net zero 
CO2 emissions can 
be prescribed, as 




targeted in the long 
term.  
Net annual negative 
emissions levels by 
the end of the 
century are varied 
from 0 to about 11 
GtCO2/yr.  
Non-CO2 emissions 
are limited at a 
level consistent 
with the effort of 




Emissions and warming variations 149 
We now apply this new scenario logic (Table 1) to a model of the energy-economy-environment 150 
system (see Methods) to illustrate how its implementation maps onto a range of global temperature 151 
outcomes and how it allows for a more direct representation of intergenerational and technological 152 
decisions or choices compared to the currently dominant end-of-century approach.  153 
The three design elements proposed in Table 1 map usefully onto the three temperature evolution 154 
characteristics that define our new scenario logic: the timing and level of peak warming, as well as 155 
the rate of temperature decline thereafter (Figure 1). Different combinations of CO2 and non-CO2 156 
mitigation span much of the variation that can be found across a wide set of scenarios available in 157 
the literature8; and reiterate the importance of paying attention to both CO2 and non-CO2 emissions 158 
reductions44. When non-CO2 emissions are reduced consistently with the implied carbon price 159 
assumed for carbon-dioxide (red markers in Figure 1), the range of temperature outcomes is much 160 
narrower than the full range. For example, in the very unlikely case where non-CO2 emission would 161 
not be penalized at all while CO2 is reduced to zero and beyond (Extended Data Figure 1) peak 162 
warming could be markedly higher and warming would not fully stabilize during the 21st century 163 
(Figure 1, orange crosses). This case is anticipated to be an overestimate of the potential variation 164 
due to non-CO2 mitigation choices, particularly in light of recent policy developments that emphasize 165 
action on short-lived climate forcers, including methane45, and fluorinated gases under another 166 
international agreement, the Montreal Protocol46.  167 
Our scenario framework decouples the transition in the first half of the century from the stable 168 
emissions achieved in the longer term. Peak global warming is therefore disconnected from the total 169 
amount of net negative emissions over the 21st century. End-of-century warming is still determined 170 
by the difference between CO2 emitted until net zero, and the net amount of CO2 removed 171 
afterwards (Fig. 2, maximum cumulative CO2 since 2010 and shaded grey background showing total 172 
net negative emissions until 2100). However, peak warming and its timing do not depend on the 173 
amount of post-peak net negative emissions. In addition, the main climate outcome characteristics 174 
Page 10/36 
over the 21st century would also be largely independent of the chosen discount rate, in contrast to 175 
scenarios designed with the current end-of-century focussed approach.  176 
This scenario logic hence presents the amount of societally acceptable warming and net negative 177 
emissions as an explicit design choice and allows one to explicitly explore intertemporal mitigation 178 
questions. Considering these aspects explicitly at the scenario design stage allows to cover a much 179 
wider domain of potential low-carbon scenarios and more nuanced exploration of futures compared 180 
to focussing on an end-of-century target only (see variation in different red versus blue markers in 181 
Fig. 2, see also Methods). 182 
If achieving net negative CO2 emissions in the second half of the century is considered either 183 
inconceivable or undesirable, global-mean temperature will at best stabilize around peak warming. 184 
Under these assumptions, emissions over the next 3 to 4 decades determine the long-term 185 
temperature outcome (Fig. 2). On the other hand, annually removing a certain net amount of CO2 186 
would result in a gradual decline of global mean temperatures over time43, provided that also non-187 
CO2 emissions are limited to a sufficient degree (Methods, Fig. 1c, Extended Data Table 1). Specific 188 
levels of either peak or end-of-century warming can be reached with a diverse range of net negative 189 
emissions, here ranging from 0 to more than 10 GtCO2/yr (Fig. 2).  190 
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 191 
Figure 2 | Variations in the contribution of net negative emissions in reaching specific temperature outcomes over the 192 
course of the century. Relationship between maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2010 onward (proportional to peak 193 
global mean temperature rise as shown on a second horizontal axis, see Fig. 1b) and year-2100 warming, as a function of 194 
total net negative emissions over the 21st century (grey shaded background). Single scenarios are depicted with symbols 195 
that show the net annual negative CO2 emissions achieved in 2100. Red symbols depict scenarios that follow the design 196 
presented in this study, while blue symbols depict how a carbon budget is used when optimized over the entire century. 197 
Blue scenarios are linked with a dashed line to illustrate the limited solution space that would be covered when using a 198 
standard full century carbon budget approach only, compared to the wider space of independent climate outcomes that is 199 
achieved when the design presented in this study is followed (red markers).  200 
 201 
Negative emissions alternatives 202 
An important part of the on-going climate mitigation debate has focussed on the scale of negative 203 
emissions16,21,23. Ultimately, it is the gross deployment of CDR options and their key technological 204 
components that underpins sustainability and feasibility concerns. For example, the sustainability of 205 
large-scale bioenergy production has been questioned due to its pressure on water and food 206 
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security21,47,48. Alternatively, the scale of carbon-dioxide capture, transportation and sequestration 207 
(CCS) infrastructure in scenarios could be hard to achieve49,50. Our scenario framework as presented 208 
in Table 1 does not eliminate these concerns directly, but it offers a way to explore choices and 209 
strategies in relation to these CDR options in the context of firmly achieving the Paris LTTG in a way 210 
which was not possible with approaches that focus on end-of-century outcomes only (Fig. 3, 211 
Extended Data Table 2). Specifically, our new framework provides a logic that enables studies to 212 
explore future CDR deployment as an independent variation under a desired temperature outcome. 213 
For example, to a certain degree one can vary the acceptable deployment levels of both bioenergy 214 
and CCS (or its combined use BECCS) independently of the net level of negative emissions (Fig. 3, 215 
Extended Data Fig. 2) and hence the climate outcome. These constraints can affect the gross 216 
deployment of CDR measures and thus the sustainability and feasibility assessment of stringent 217 
mitigation goals. For example, annual net negative emissions of about 4 GtCO2/yr could be achieved 218 
with different system configurations that see CCS deployment vary by a factor of 5, and bioenergy 219 
use either venturing into a domain for which increasing sustainability concerns have been identified47 220 
(>150 EJ/yr) or being kept at levels where sustainability concerns could be limited47,48 (<100 EJ/yr) 221 
(Fig. 3). This illustrates also that the overall level of bioenergy deployment is not simply a function of 222 
BECCS deployment51. Also the total amount of CO2 generated varies by a factor of 4 across 223 
alternative system configurations with net negative emissions of about 4 GtCO2/yr, indicating 224 
markedly different challenges for achieving required levels of gross negative emissions.  225 
The variations highlighted here are illustrative and further dimensions could easily be explored, like 226 
capping the extent of afforestation, the total amount of gross CDR, or limiting the overall amount of 227 
CO2 that is generated annually by the entire economy. Furthermore, concerns do not only have to 228 
apply to the availability of certain technological options in the second half of the century, but can 229 
also apply to the pace and timing of their scale up over the next decades. Even to achieve global net 230 
zero CO2 emissions, scenarios often use sizeable amounts of CDR that require technologies to be 231 
scaled up well before the point global net zero CO2 emissions are achieved29,52-54 (Extended Data Figs 232 
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2 and 3). An illustrative overview of these and other concerns is provided in Extended Data Table 2 233 
together with a suggestion of how they could be explored as part of the scenario framework 234 
presented here. Hence, despite only covering a limited subset of potential sensitivity cases, the 235 
variations shown here already illustrate the interplay between mitigation action over the coming 236 
decades, the level of CDR technology deployment that given our current understanding can be 237 
considered acceptable21,23, and the achievability of stringent temperature targets over the course of 238 
the 21st century. 239 
          240 
Figure 3 | Scenario variations of system configurations and of contributions of carbon-dioxide removal (CDR) technologies 241 
and bioenergy to achieve different levels of negative emissions. System variations to achieve four net negative emissions 242 
levels (0, 4, 7, and 11 GtCO2/yr). Five illustrative system variations are shown per level labelled A to E, and defined in Extended 243 
Data Tables 3 and 4. CO2-related values (black bars and red lines) are read on the left axis. Primary energy contributions from 244 
bioenergy (yellow features) are read on the right axis. Scenarios labelled with “NA” did not solve under the imposed CDR and 245 
bioenergy constraints (Extended Data Table 4). Fossil fuel and industry CCS contributions (white hatched areas) represent 246 
CO2 that is generated but not emitted to the atmosphere. Net negative CO2 emissions are the sum of gross positive CO2 247 
emissions from energy and industrial sources and gross positive land-use CO2 emissions. Gross negative CO2 emissions 248 
comprise gross land-use CO2 emissions, and CDR through BECCS. The combined size of all bars per scenario gives an indication 249 
of the overall size of the remaining CO2 producing system by the end of the century. The 2080-2100 period is chosen because 250 
the lowest net negative emission levels explored in these illustrative scenarios is reached only two decades after reaching 251 
net-zero CO2 emissions.  252 
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Mitigation investment legacy 253 
The staged design of our scenario framework also allows studies to explore intertemporal mitigation 254 
investment decisions (Fig. 4). Unsurprisingly, estimated mitigation investments until net zero CO2 are 255 
strongly related to the desired level of peak warming (Fig. 4c). Similarly, mitigation investments in 256 
the 20 years after temperature has peaked increase robustly with the magnitude of desired long-257 
term net negative CO2 emissions (Fig. 4d). However, once a long-term level of net negative emissions 258 
is achieved, scenarios following the new design show little variation in mitigation investments 259 
estimated to sustain emissions at a specific level (Fig. 4e), and are also markedly smaller than those 260 
estimated under a standard end-of-century perspective.  261 
The precise magnitude of these investment numbers is illustrative, because they are based on a 262 
single model, while technology and other socioeconomic assumptions are known to impact cost 263 
estimates to an important degree55,56. At the same time, relative changes are considered to be more 264 
robust8 and highlight intertemporal policy choices. For example, the patterns in Figure 4 illustrate 265 
how the pace of emissions reductions over the coming decades and the corresponding peak warming 266 
affects projected mitigation costs in the longer term. These patterns reflect explicit policy choices 267 
about the timing and stringency of climate action, and contrast with limited choices that are 268 
suggested with a standard approach of aiming for end-of-century targets only (blue features). The 269 
latter show a similar evolution in the period until carbon neutrality (Fig. 4c). However, particularly in 270 
the period after carbon neutrality, the newly proposed approach highlights the diversity in choices 271 
available to decision makers, as well as the implications and legacy of decisions over the coming 272 
decades for future generations. 273 
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 274 
Figure 4 | Global mitigation investment evolutions and choices in scenarios. a, schematic of time periods explored in other 275 
panels; b, schematic of mitigation investments over time (hatched areas); c–e, estimated annual average global mitigation 276 
investments as a percentage of global gross domestic product (GDP) for different time periods; c, average annual investments 277 
from 2020 until the time net zero CO2 emissions are reached as a function of peak global mean temperature rise. Dotted lines 278 
connect subsets of scenarios with similar key assumptions not visible on the graph. In panel c they connect scenarios with 279 
the same levels of net CDR by the end of the century; d, average annual investments in the 20 years after achieving net zero 280 
CO2 emissions as a function of the level of net negative CO2 emissions to be achieved. Dotted lines connect subsets of 281 
scenarios with the same levels of peak global mean temperature rise; e, average annual investments in the 2080-2100 period 282 
as a function of the rate of global mean temperature change in the same period. Dotted lines connect subsets of scenarios 283 
with the same levels of peak global mean temperature rise; c–e, red symbols are scenarios following this study’s design, blue 284 
symbols follow a standard end-of-century carbon budget optimisation. Scenarios with different net zero CO2 emission years 285 
are distinguished by different marker fill colours as defined in panel d.  286 
287 
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Further exploration 288 
The here proposed scenario framework provides a starting point to more explicitly address a variety 289 
of choices decision makers face in pursuit of the achievement of the Paris Agreement LTTG. The new 290 
framework’s logic can be used to create scenarios that inform mitigation choices in the context of 291 
intergenerational societal concerns or technological limitations (Extended Data Table 2). Many of the 292 
conditions that affect scenario projections are highly uncertain in nature, and our understanding of 293 
these aspects is thus expected to evolve over time. This strongly suggests that methods to identify 294 
robust features of climate action should be incorporated in the scenario design approach described 295 
here, as well as adaptive strategies to reconsider these actions over time57. Doing so would enable 296 
better understanding of the implications of decisions made today and help align climate action and 297 
other societal objectives now and into the future.   298 
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Methods 299 
Interpretations of the Paris Agreement Long-Term Temperature Goal (LTTG).  300 
The Paris Agreement LTTG is defined in the agreement’s text6 as: “Holding the increase in the global 301 
average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the 302 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly 303 
reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”. This wording provides quantitative benchmarks 304 
within which all acceptable temperature outcomes are supposed to fall. However, some issues 305 
remain open7.  306 
A first issue is the level of warming that governments would consider consistent with a maximum 307 
level of “well below 2°C”. In earlier UNFCCC texts58, the global temperature goal was only expressed 308 
in terms of holding warming “below 2°C”. This “below 2°C” goal has been interpreted in documents 309 
at the science-policy interface as avoiding 2°C of global warming with at least a 66% probability59,60. 310 
The precise implications of the strengthening of the legal language expressing the international 311 
temperature goal (from “below 2°C” to “well below 2°C”) are not quantified or made explicit in 312 
current policy discussions. A second issue is the interpretation of the statement that the Paris 313 
Agreement is “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial 314 
levels”. This wording leaves open whether 1.5°C is applied to limiting peak or long-term warming, or 315 
both (that is, whether 1.5°C is never exceeded or is achieved after a slightly higher, yet still “well 316 
below 2°C”, peak). Finally, the Paris Agreement as a whole “aims to strengthen the global response 317 
to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate 318 
poverty”. Whether this context of sustainable development is fully covered by the UN Sustainable 319 
Development Goals (SDGs, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-320 
goals.html) is not specified. This hence requires climate mitigation strategies to be considered and 321 
explored within a wider context of multiple societal objectives, many of which are not quantitatively 322 
defined at the moment. In conclusion, scientific studies of the Paris Agreement LTTG thus have to 323 
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cover an adequate space of potential outcomes in line with the envelope defined by all aspects of the 324 
Paris Agreement. The framework presented in this study addresses many of these issues explicitly. 325 
Model and data 326 
We use the MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM integrated assessment model61 driven by middle-of-the-road 327 
(SSP2) assumptions of future socioeconomic baseline development55,62 for the central scenario cases, 328 
and variations reflecting a more sustainable (SSP1) and a more fragmented (SSP3) world for some of 329 
the sensitivity cases in Figure 1. A detailed description of the SSP implementation is provided in an 330 
earlier publication62, and the SSP model documentation63 is available at 331 
http://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/message-globiom/.  332 
For the temperature assessment of the scenarios, we use the MAGICC reduced complexity carbon-333 
cycle and carbon model64 in the same setup as used for the SSP future greenhouse gas projections for 334 
the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project’s Sixth Phase (CMIP6) with a 2.5K climate sensitivity, a 335 
carbon cycle calibrated to emulate the UVIC model and with the permafrost feedback module65 336 
enabled. Furthermore, we use updated CO2, N2O and CH4 forcing algorithms to represent the higher 337 
methane forcing as suggested by the Oslo line-by-line model results66. Global mean temperature 338 
increase refers here to the change in globally averaged surface air temperatures. Alternative model 339 
calibrations might lead to slightly different levels of warming compared to those reported in Figure 1, 340 
yet would not affect the overall concept and framework presented here. Permafrost thawing 341 
feedbacks could release CO2 on timescales beyond the 21st century and this would subsequently 342 
require some level of net CDR to keep global mean temperature stabilized after 210067,68. The setup 343 
used here has an implied transient climate response to cumulative emissions of carbon (TCRE) of 344 
about 0.46°C per 1000 PgC, centrally located in the 0.2-0.7°C per 1000 GtCO2 range assessed in the 345 
IPCC Working Group I contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report34 (AR5). Given the assessed 346 
uncertainties in the Earth system response to CO2 emissions34,43, a sustained annual removal of CO2 347 
of 1 GtCO2/yr is estimated to result in global temperatures declining by about 0.02–0.07°C per 348 
decade, particularly if peak warming is kept low68, which can be translated into the number of years 349 
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required to reduce global mean temperature rise by 0.1°C given a sustained level of annual net 350 
negative emissions (see Extended Data Table 1).  351 
More generally in multi-gas scenarios, however, temperature change is further modulated by 352 
changes in the emissions of other climate forcers45,69. These are included in our scenarios and linked 353 
to their common sources of CO2 emissions when appropriate69-72. A set of sensitivity cases explores 354 
their contribution further (see below).  355 
Literature scenario data for Figure 1 is drawn from the IPCC AR5 Working Group III Scenario 356 
Database, which is hosted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and 357 
available online at https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB/. Data is shown for a large range of scenarios, 358 
many of which are not necessarily consistent with the Paris Agreement (for example, see Fig. 1b). 359 
However, they are included to illustrate that the assumed relationships are valid over a wider range 360 
than that which is allowed for by the Paris Agreement.  361 
Approach & protocol 362 
Our proposed approach deconstructs the Paris Agreement’s LTTG in three structural elements: the 363 
level of peak warming, the timing of peak warming, and the rate of temperature change after the 364 
peak. Each of these elements is modelled independently (see also Extended Data Table 3):  365 
Timing of peak warming  The timing of peak warming is modelled by setting the year in which global 366 
net CO2 emissions are to become zero. The years 2050, 2060, and 2070 are explored here.  367 
Level of peak warming  The level of peak warming is modelled by setting a maximum limit to the 368 
total amount of CO2 emissions until the time net CO2 emissions have to become zero. This is 369 
implemented by setting a maximum to the average annual total CO2 emission level from 2021 to the 370 
time of net zero CO2. The various values that are explored here are: 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 PgC/yr (or 371 
about 11, 15, 18, 22, 29, and 37 in GtCO2/yr). See Extended Data Table 3 for the implied cumulative 372 
CO2 emissions until net zero for each modelled case. In addition, non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions 373 
are limited by imposing an equivalent carbon price consistent with the modelled CO2 reductions, 374 
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using AR4 100-year global warming potential for the conversion between non-CO2 greenhouse gases 375 
and CO2.  376 
Post-peak rate of temperature change  The rate of temperature change after peak warming is 377 
modelled by prescribing the level of net CO2 emissions to be achieved two to three decades after 378 
global CO2 emissions reached net zero. Levels corresponding to annual net negative CO2 emissions of 379 
0, 1, 2, and 3 PgC/yr (or 0, 3.7, 7.3, and 11 in GtCO2/yr) have been explored. Also here continued 380 
attention to limit non-CO2 emissions is necessary. 381 
This modelling protocol can be utilized directly without any modifications in IAMs that rely on an 382 
intertemporal optimization method. To avoid end-point effects, all three constraints have been 383 
optimized simultaneously in the illustrative scenarios computed for this paper over a period that is at 384 
least one time step longer than the year of latest emissions constraint (in this case, the level of net 385 
negative emissions 20 years after reaching carbon neutrality). In recursive-dynamic IAMs, the CO2 386 
emissions budget until reaching net zero emissions, needs to be translated into an emissions 387 
trajectory, using a heuristic to distribute the budget over time (for example, the hoteling rule). The 388 
net CO2 emissions after reaching net zero can again be implemented as an emissions constraint.   389 
Furthermore, technology variations in two dimensions have been implemented to illustrate the 390 
possibility of exploring the achievement of net negative CO2 emissions levels with different energy 391 
system and CDR technology configurations leading to varying contributions of gross negative CO2 392 
emissions:  393 
Different deployment rates of total CCS  Maximum yearly levels of total global CCS deployment have 394 
been specified. The following levels have been explored: no limit, 8, 5, 2, and 1 PgC/yr (or 29.3, 18.3, 395 
7.3, and 3.7 in GtCO2/yr). All no-CCS cases were found to be infeasible under the constraints and 396 
middle-of-the-road socioeconomic assumptions62 used in this study. 397 
Different levels of bioenergy  Maximum yearly levels of the amount of primary energy from biomass 398 
are set, not to be exceeded at any year during the entire century. The following levels have been 399 
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explored: no limit, 200, 150, 100, 80 and 60 EJ/yr, informed by the sustainability concerns identified 400 
in an earlier study47. An overview of explored sensitivity cases is provided in Extended Data Table 4, a 401 
selection of which is shown in Fig. 3 and Extended Data Figs 2 and 3.  402 
Suite of core scenarios  Extended Data Table 3 lists all scenarios following the new design presented 403 
in this paper, and their respective specifications. For each scenario, the MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM model 404 
is run in three stages. First, it is solved in line with the three CO2 constraints as specified in Table 1, 405 
and detailed in Extended Data Table 3. Then, in a second stage, consistent evolutions of other forcers 406 
are derived. The price of carbon obtained in stage 1 from the per-year shadow prices on the CO2 407 
constraint is applied as a tax to all non-CO2 emissions as a proxy of equivalent mitigation efforts. This 408 
could be varied and would influence temperature projections for the scenarios, but would not affect 409 
the more general insights as presented in Figs 1 to 4 (see also the non-CO2 sensitivity case description 410 
below). Because sources of CO2 and non-CO2 emissions are at times linked, applying these taxes to all 411 
greenhouse gas emissions influences the marginal abatement costs of carbon emissions. Therefore, 412 
in a third step, the model is iteratively solved updating these taxes, until the maximum deviation 413 
between the shadow price of carbon and the taxes imposed on non-carbon emissions in any year is 414 
below 5%. 415 
Sensitivity scenarios  Extended Data Table 4 lists the specifications for a suite of scenarios that 416 
illustrate the possibility of exploring the sensitivity of mitigation efforts with regard to maximum CCS 417 
deployment and the use of bioenergy in the energy system. Many additional sensitivity cases can be 418 
used to explore further dimensions, as illustrated in Extended Data Table 2.  419 
Two additional sensitivity sets that vary non-CO2 mitigation have been developed to explore the 420 
influence non-CO2 mitigation can have on the climate performance of our scenario logic. A first non-421 
CO2 sensitivity set assumes no penalty on non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions at all, and only sees 422 
non-CO2 emissions reductions that are dictated by the phase-out of emissions sources that are 423 
shared with CO2. A second non-CO2 sensitivity set explores the most stringent end of non-CO2 424 
mitigation by assuming an exponentially increasing emissions price on non-CO2 emissions, starting at 425 
Page 22/36 
200 USD/tCO2e and increasing exponentially with 5% per year until 2100. These sensitivity cases are 426 
further illustrated in Extended Data Figure 1.   427 
Comparison scenarios  Additionally, a set of traditional mitigation scenarios that aim at optimizing a 428 
carbon budget over the entire century is created, as a point of comparison (blue features in Figs 2 429 
and 4, and Extended Data Figure 4).  430 
Under the assumptions used by the scenario ensemble for this study (see above), the lowest peak 431 
warming achieved in our scenarios is about 1.6°C relative to preindustrial levels. In this study we do 432 
not explore whether achieving lower levels of peak warming is categorically excluded. Maximum 433 
values of about 1.5°C have been reported by studies exploring strong mitigation futures using more 434 
favourable socioeconomic assumptions (including reduced global inequalities and efficiency 435 
improvements beyond the historical experience)73. 436 
Data availability  437 
Online data documentation63 for the SSP implementation is available at 438 
http://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/message-globiom/. The scenario data analysed during the current study 439 
are available online at https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/postparis-explorer (DOI: 10.22022/ene/06-440 
2019.48). 441 
Code availability 442 
The MESSAGEix modelling framework61, including its macroeconomic module MACRO, is available 443 
under an APACHE 2.0 open-source license at http://github.com/iiasa/message_ix. Data can be 444 
analysed online via a dedicated scenario explorer instance at https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/postparis-445 
explorer, although analytical codes for producing the manuscript figures are not available.  446 
447 
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Extended Data: Figures 669 
 670 
Extended Data Figure 1 | Illustration of non-CO2 mitigation sensitivity cases. a, emission price trajectories 671 
applied to non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions in the default and the two sensitivity cases. In line with the scope 672 
of emissions covered under the UNFCCC, emissions from aerosol or aerosol precursor species like black carbon 673 
(BC) or sulphur-dioxide are not explicitly subjected to a carbon price; b-g, resulting emissions of CO2 and internally 674 
consistent evolutions of a selection of non-CO2 emissions; h-j, impact of non-CO2 sensitivity cases on decadal rate 675 
of temperature change in the 2090-2100 period. Note that the sensitivity case assuming zero penalty on non-676 
CO2 emissions is extremely unlikely in light of recent efforts that specifically target reductions of methane and 677 
fluorinated gas emissions. Emissions of non-CO2 gases are translated into CO2 equivalence using global warming 678 
potentials over a 100-year time horizon as reported in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 679 
Panel on Climate Change. 680 
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 681 
Extended Data Figure 2| Illustration of variation of CO2 contributions in scenarios with identical temperature 682 




Extended Data Figure 3| Illustration of system configurations and of contributions of carbon-dioxide removal 686 
(CDR) technologies to achieve net zero CO2 emissions. Corresponding system configurations are shown for all 687 
cases shown in main text Figure 3. The four levels of net negative CO2 emissions to be achieved by the end of the 688 
century are for identification purposes only and are not visible on this figure, as they will only be achieved after 689 
the point of reaching net-zero CO2 emissions. Five illustrative system variations are shown per level labelled A to 690 
E, and defined in Extended Data Tables 3 and 4. Scenarios labelled with “NA” did not solve under the imposed 691 
CDR and bioenergy constraints (Extended Data Table 4). Fossil fuel and industry CCS contributions (white hatched 692 
areas) represent CO2 that is generated but not emitted to the atmosphere. Net negative CO2 emissions are the 693 
sum of gross positive CO2 emissions from energy and industrial sources and gross positive land-use CO2 694 
emissions, and are zero by design in this time step. Gross negative CO2 emissions comprise gross land-use CO2 695 
emissions, and CDR through BECCS. The combined size of all bars per scenario gives an indication of the overall 696 
size of the remaining CO2 producing system by the end of the century. Because the timing of CDR upscaling and 697 
amount of CDR at the time of reaching global net zero CO2 emissions was not explicitly varied in the set of 698 
illustrative scenarios developed for this study, it would be wrong to interpret the narrow degree of variation and 699 
general agreement across scenarios as a robust feature. Variations could be explored through additional 700 
dedicated studies as highlighted in Extended Data Table 2. 701 
 702 
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 704 
Extended Data Figure 4| Illustration of scenario variation and differences between the scenario logic presented 705 
in this study and an end-of-century scenario approach. Pink to red scenarios in panel a show scenarios created 706 
with the scenario logic presented in this paper, while blue dashed scenarios show scenarios created with an end-707 
of-century scenario approach (see labelling). Panel b shows that for a given amount of cumulative CO2 emissions 708 
all scenarios result in a similar amount of temperature increase by 2100, but different levels of maximum (peak) 709 
warming. Panel c is a replication of Figure 3 in the main text showing how stable emissions levels in the second 710 
half of the century can be achieved by a variety of system configurations with different amounts of CDR. Note 711 
that to achieve a scenario that limits global mean temperature rise in 2100 to 1.5°C, the standard end-of-century 712 
scenario approach would suggest net negative CO2 emissions of about 15 GtCO2/yr in 2100, while the scenario 713 
logic presented in this paper allows to construct scenarios that achieve that temperature in 2100 with zero to 714 
about 5 GtCO2/yr of net negative CO2 emissions, and a variety of gross CDR contributions.   715 
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Extended Data: Tables 716 
 717 
Extended Data Table 1 | Years required to reduce global mean temperature rise by 0.1°C given varying levels 718 
of sustained net negative emissions. These values are based on a TCRE of 0.46°C per 1000 GtCO2. The range 719 
between brackets gives the range for the IPCC AR5 TCRE range of 0.2–0.7°C per 1000 GtCO2.  720 
 
Level of sustained net annual net negative emissions  












Years required to reduce global-mean temperature rise  
by 0.1°C [years] 
 
43 (29-92) 22 (15-46) 11 (7-23) 4 (3-9) 2 (1-5) 
 721 
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Extended Data Table 2 | Illustrative overview of potential extensions of the scenario framework. Selection of 723 
concerns related to carbon-dioxide removal (CDR), pace and timing of technology deployment, water 724 
requirement, regional differentiation, and non-CO2 emissions, as well as potential extensions of the here 725 
suggested scenario design that would allow studies to explore each of these concerns. This list is purely 726 
illustrative and non-exhaustive. 727 
Concern to be addressed Scenario design allowing to explore concern 
 
Scale of carbon-dioxide removal (CDR) 
 
 
 Bioenergy combined with carbon 
capture and storage (BECCS) 
Limits can be prescribed to:  
- BECCS as a whole 
- Particular types of BECCS, like biomass power generation with CCS 
- BECCS subcomponents like the amount of bioenergy from different sources (first 
generation, second generation, residues only, …), or the scale of CCS 
 Afforestation Limits can be prescribed to the overall scale in units of CO2 removed by afforestation 
 Other CDR methods Other CDR methods like direct air capture and sequestration (DACS), biochar, or enhanced 
weathering, can be included in scenarios, potentially accompanied by limits to their maximum 
scale 
 
Land requirements of CDR  
 Bioenergy Limits can be set to where and how much land is used for bioenergy production, and in which 
areas it can expand 
 Afforestation Limits can be set to where and how much land is used for afforestation, and in which areas it can 
expand 
 
Timing and pace of deployment  
 BECCS The year in which BECCS is thought to become available can be varied (e.g. 2040 or 2050 only) 
as can its cost assumptions and maximum pace by which it could scale up 
 Other CDR methods The year in which CDR methods are thought to become available can be varied (e.g. 2040, 
2050, or later) as can their cost assumptions and the maximum pace at which they could scale 
up 
 Potential land conversion The maximum pace of land conversion (e.g. in million hectares per decade) from one type to 
another in a given region or globally can be capped  
 Renewable energy technologies The maximum annual expansion rate and cost assumptions of renewable energies can be varied 
 Nuclear technology The maximum annual expansion rate, and cost assumptions of nuclear energy can be varied 
 General societal acceptability For any mitigation measure or technology, its use and expansion can be capped or modified as a 
function of assumed future societal acceptability of given technology or measure 
 
Water requirements  
 Bioenergy The total amount of water available for irrigation of bioenergy crops can be capped either globally 
or per region 
 Afforestation The total amount of water available for drinking water can be mandated per region 
 
Regional differentiation  
 Regional distribution of 
mitigation potentials 
Although generally already varied per region, deployment of specific technologies and availability 
of resources could be varied per region 
 Institutional barriers to 
implementation 
Cost of capital and investment discount rates can be varied per region depending on institutional 
circumstances 
 
Non-CO2 mitigation  
 Differential mitigation of different 
greenhouse gases 
Emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases with different lifetimes can be penalized to a different 
degree (e.g. long-lived vs short-lived greenhouse gases) 
 Alternative mitigation timing Mitigation of emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases can be delayed or brought forward by 
penalizing their emissions following a specific cost trajectory over time 
 728 
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Extended Data Table 3 | Overview of core set of scenarios available in this study and their design specifications. 730 
Each triplet of peak warming year, average annual emissions until net zero, and average annual net negative 731 
emissions levels defines one scenario and is represented by one red diamond in Figure 1. All scenarios have been 732 
modelled under SSP1 and SSP2 assumptions. Scenarios marked with # have additionally been modelled under 733 
SSP3 assumptions. Further CCS and bioenergy variations are available for a subset of scenarios with peak 734 
warming in 2050 and achieving 0, 1, 2, or 3 PgC/yr of net negative emissions by the end of the century. Grey 735 
shaded scenario specifications are scenarios for which further sensitivity cases have been developed, as indicated 736 
in Extended Data Table 4. Sensitivity cases are illustrated in Fig. 3. The cases highlighted here are labelled with 737 
“A” in Fig. 3.  One unit of PgC equals 3.664 units of GtCO2. Values in GtCO2/yr are provided between brackets, 738 
rounded to the nearest unit. The scenario shown in panel b of Extended Data Figure 2 is indicated below with 739 
curly brackets.  740 
 741 
 742 























































2050# 10 (37) 290 (1063) 0 (0)#  2060 8 (29) 312 (1143) 0 (0)# 
   1 (4)#     1 (4)# 
   2 (7)#     2 (7)# 
   3 (11)     3 (11)# 
2050 8 (29) 232 (850) 0 (0)#   6 (22) 234 (857) 0 (0)# 
   1 (4)#     1 (4)# 
   2 (7)#     2 (7)# 
   3 (11)     3 (11)# 
2050 6 (22) 174 (638) 0 (0)#   {b}   4 (15) 156 (572) 0 (0)# 
   1 (4)#     1 (4)# 
   2 (7)#     2 (7)# 
   3 (11)     3 (11)# 
2050 4 (15) 116 (425) 0 (0)      
   1 (4)  2070 4 (15) 196 (718) 0 (0)# 
   2 (7)     1 (4)# 
   3 (11)     2 (7)# 
        3 (11)# 
2070 3 (11) 147 (539) 0 (0)#   5 (18) 245 (898) 0 (0)# 
   1 (4)#     1 (4)# 
   2 (7)#     2 (7)# 
   3 (11)#     3 (11)# 
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Extended Data Table 4 | Overview of sensitivity cases for CCS and bioenergy use. Sensitivity cases are variations 744 
of the grey shaded core scenarios in Extended Data Table 3. Scenarios for which the model solved successfully 745 
are indicated with “1”: scenarios that did not solve are indicated with “N/A”. Orange shaded scenario are shown 746 
in Figure 3, in addition to the scenarios highlighted in Extended Data Table 3. One unit of PgC equals 3.664 units 747 
of GtCO2 and values in GtCO2/yr are provided between brackets, rounded to the nearest unit. Bold italicized 748 
characters B, C, D, and E indicate the labels used in Figure 3. Characters between curly brackets identify the 749 
scenarios shown in Extended Data Figure 2. 750 
  
 
Net amount of annual negative emissions  
at end of 21st century [PgC/yr] (GtCO2/yr)  
 
Maximum level of annual 
bioenergy use during 21st 
century (primary energy) [EJ/yr]  
 
Maximum level of annual CCS 
deployment during 21st century 
[PgC/yr] (GtCO2/yr)  
0 (0) 1 (3.7) 2 (7.3) 3 (11.0) 
      
60 No limit 1   {e} N/A N/A N/A 
0 (0) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 (7.3) 1 E {f} N/A N/A N/A 
5 (18.3) 1 N/A N/A N/A 
      
80 No limit 1 1 E N/A N/A 
0 (0) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 (7.3) 1 D N/A N/A N/A 
5 (18.3) 1 N/A N/A N/A 
      
100 No limit 1 1 N/A N/A 
0 (0) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 (7.3) 1 1 D N/A N/A 
5 (18.3) 1 1 N/A N/A 
      
150 No limit 1   {c} 1 1 C N/A 
0 (0) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1 (3.7) 1   {i} N/A N/A N/A 
2 (7.3) 1 C 1 C N/A N/A 
5 (18.3) 1 B 1 B N/A N/A 
      
200 No limit 1 1 1 B 1 B 
0 (0) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1 (3.7) 1 N/A N/A N/A 
2 (7.3) 1 N/A N/A N/A 
5 (18.3) 1 1 N/A N/A 
      
No limit No limit 1    
0 (0) N/A    
1 (3.7) 1   {h}    
2 (7.3) 1   {g}    
5 (18.3) 1   {d}    
      
 751 
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